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INTRODUCTION
This Reply Brief addresses only those matters raised by the
cross-appeal of plaintiffs-appellees Alta Industries Ltd. dba
Steelco and Alta Industries - Utah, Inc. (hereinafter, "Steelco")
Steelco's opening Brief on the cross-appeal is found at pages
80-91 of its "Brief of Appellees and Cross-Appellants." The
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Response of defendants-appellants to that cross-appeal is found
at pages 44-51 of the "Reply Brief of Defendants/Appellants and
Reply to Cross-Appeal."
This Reply Brief does not reply to the remainder of the
Reply Brief of defendants-appellants because the rules do not
permit such a reply.
dure.

Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-

Steelco has filed a Motion to Strike the Reply Brief of

defendants-appellants because it impermissibly introduces extensive materials (including 20-odd pages of factual argument) that
were not limited to answering the matters set forth in Steelcofs
Brief.

That Motion was unresolved as of the date of filing of

this Brief.
The trial court found for Steelco on its fraud, conversion,
and conspiracy theories, but upon purely legal grounds rejected
Steelcofs claims for the same losses under the Racketeering
Enterprises Act and under Utahfs receiving stolen property
statute.

Steelco's cross-appeal challenges only the trial

court's rejection of its racketeering and statutory receiving
stolen property claims.
ARGUMENT
Steelcofs claims under the Racketeering Enterprises Act and
receiving stolen property statute arise from a relatively simple,
often repeated, factual pattern.

The claims involve the same

three persons -- Volma Heaton and Chris Williams, who were both
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then employees of Steelco, and defendant Lynn Hurst, who was then
general manager of defendant Wasatch Steel.

Over a four-plus

year period, Volma Heaton stole on the order of 100 loads of
steel from his employer, Steelco, and delivered that steel to
Wasatch Steel.

[R336, et: ^e£. ; Findings of Fact 116, 8, 11.]

[R451 at 6, 148-50.]

Chris Williams sometimes assisted Heaton in

his deliveries and accompanied him on his trips to Wasatch Steel.
[R451 at 6, 148-50.]

The fact that Heaton stole this steel from

his employer, Steelco, and delivered it to Wasatch Steel is not
disputed.

It is also not disputed that Wasatch Steel paid Heaton

only a fraction of the value of the steel, as the court found.
[Findings of Fact 127; R343; R450 at 52-53.]

The trial court

found that both Hurst and Wasatch Steel knew that Heaton was
stealing the steel materials from Steelco and delivering and
reselling them to Wasatch Steel.

[R338; Findings of Fact 113.]

Indeed, the trial court found a fraud and conspiracy between
Wasatch Steel and Hurst, on the one hand, and Volma Heaton, on
the other hand, to steal material from Steelco for use and resale
by Wasatch Steel.

[Findings of Fact 1114, 15, 26; R339, et seq.]

The trial court also found that Wasatch Steel and Hurst paid
at least eleven kickbacks to the very same Steelco employees
involved in the theft scheme -- Volma Heaton and Chris Williams.
[R344-45; Findings of Fact 132.]

Wasatch Steel and Hurst paid

those kickbacks to Steelcofs employees to induce them to cause

-3-

their employer, Steelco, to pay more for materials purchased from
Wasatch Steel than would otherwise have been paid.
Findings of Fact 1133, 34.]

[R345-47;

The trial court similarly found both

a fraud and a conspiracy between Wasatch Steel and Hurst, on the
one hand, and Heaton and Williams, on the other hand, to inflate
the prices paid by Steelco for materials that it purchased from
Wasatch Steel.

[R345, et. £e£. ; Findings of Fact 1133-45.]

Steelcofs racketeering and receiving stolen property claims
arise from the theft and bribery transactions generally outlined
above.

Although these theories afford recovery of the very same

losses for which the court gave Steelco judgment under conversion, fraud, and conspiracy theories, the measure of damages and
the statutory entitlement to attorney's fees available under
these laws gave rise to Steelco1s cross-appeal.
I.

THE RACKETEERING ENTERPRISES ACT CLAIM

At pages 80-86 of its opening Brief, Steelco demonstrated
that it had proved, and the court had found, each element to
defendants1 liability under the Racketeering Enterprises Act,
Utah Code Ann. §§76-10-1601, et se%. (the "Act").

Defendants1

responsive Brief at pages 45 to 48 contains four points, which
are addressed in turn.
A.

The Separate Victim Theory.

Defendants preliminarily

argue that the trial court found that Steelco had established
none of the elements for a racketeering claim.
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The record does

not support that position.

The trial court in its Memorandum

Decision stated only the following with respect to its rejection
of Steelco's racketeering claims:
25. The acts of the parties herein do
not bring them within the racketeering act.
The necessary requirements are not met. The
Court finds that for the racketeering act to
apply, there must be three similar episodes
that involve separate and different entities,
and not within the same entity. The purpose
of the racketeering act is to prohibit
racketeering. That is, to prohibit illegal
businesses being set up to defraud other
businesses or people as a racket.
The fact
that there were similar episodes involving
Heaton and Wasatch Steel do not satisfy the
requirements. [R279.] (Emphasis added)
Thus, the only shortcoming advanced by the court in plaintiffs'
racketeering claim was plaintiffs1 failure to show three similar
episodes of unlawful activity "that involve separate and different entities.11
Consistently, the Findings of Fact entered by the trial
court at paragraph 62 stated as follows:
62. Plaintiffs did not prove the
existence of three similar episodes of
unlawful activity that involve separate and

The trial court seems to have believed that the Act was
limited to "illegal businesses" that were created to defraud
multiple victims "as a racket." Both the Utah Court of Appeals
and the United States Supreme Court have held that the Act "is
not limited in application to persons affiliated with organized
crime." State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 815 (Utah App. 1988).

different entities, as is required by the
Racketeering Act. Plaintiffs demonstrated
only that Wasatch Steel Inc. and Hurst
engaged in episodes of unlawful activity
involving Steelco, but not any other persons
or entities. [R359.]
Defendants suggest in their Brief that this "terse" finding was
somehow incomplete or flawed.

However, defendants stated

expressly to the trial court that they took "no exception" to
this very finding [R315] and did not suggest or request any other
findings on this issue in their 39 pages of objections to the
Findings and Conclusions.

[R283, et seq.]

The provisions quoted above constitute all of the court's
reasoning for its rejection of Steelco1s racketeering claim. As
is readily apparent, the only basis advanced by the court was
Steelcofs failure to demonstrate three or more episodes of
unlawful activity involving more than one victim.

Steelcofs

opening Brief at pages 84-86 demonstrates that the Act does not
require more than one victim; indeed, the Act requires that the
episodes of unlawful activity "have the same or similar purposes,
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission. . . . "
(Emphasis added.)

Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1602(2).

Defendants1

Brief does not make any effort to sustain this exclusive basis
for the court's decision.
Instead, defendants advance the following three arguments,
none of which were found, or even mentioned, by the trial court
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in either its Memorandum Decision or in its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
B.

Steelco Showed a Predicate Offense.

The trial court's

Findings establish clearly three and perhaps four predicate
offenses:
Theft.

Section 76-6-404 defines theft as follows:

A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with a purpose to deprive
him thereof.
The court found that "Heaton stole from Steelco all of the11
materials for which recovery is sought in this case.
of Fact 111; R338.]

The court found that Hurst and Wasatch Steel

knew that Heaton was stealing the materials.
113; R338.]

[Findings

[Findings of Fact

The court also found that "Wasatch Steel Inc. and

Hurst intentionally exercised dominion and control over the
Stolen Steel that was stolen by Heaton from Steelco and delivered
to Wasatch Steel Inc." and that "Wasatch Steelco Inc. and Hurst
wrongfully, intentionally, and willfully exercised dominion and
control over the Stolen Steel in violation of the rights of
Steelco and without lawful justification and intended to deprive
Steelco of the Stolen Steel."
R340-41.]

[Findings of Fact 1118, 20;

Defendants do not even address theft as a predicate

offense or these findings by the court that such thefts occurred.
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Receiving Stolen Property.

As discussed under point II of

this Brief, the trial court did reject a finding of civil liability for Wasatch Steel and Hurst's receipt of stolen property
under the receiving stolen property statute, which expressly
requires that the defendant be a person dealing in used or
secondhand property.

However, the court found all elements

necessary to establish the crime of receiving stolen property
under Subsection 1 of the same statute, §76-6-408(1), which is an
enumerated predicate offense under the Act and which does not
have any requirement that defendant be a dealer in used goods.
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1602(4)(n). Section 76-6-408(1) provides
as follows:
(1) A person commits theft if he
receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another knowing that it has been
stolen, or believing that it probably has
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding any such property from the owner,
knowing the property to be stolen, with a
purpose to deprive the owner thereof.
As shown in the preceding section, the court specifically found
that Wasatch Steel and Hurst received steel stolen from Steelco
knowing that it had been stolen and sold and disposed of that
steel, knowing it to have been stolen, with a purpose of depriving Steelco thereof.
Bribery.

Section 76-10-1602(4)(s) makes "bribery or receiv-

ing bribe by person in the business of selection, appraisal, or
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criticism of goods, Section 76-10-508" a predicate offense.
Section 76-6-508 provides that such a person is guilty of bribery
if "he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit to
influence his selection, appraisal, or criticism."

The court

unquestionably found that Volma Heaton and Chris Williams accepted the kickbacks to cause them to artificially inflate the
prices their employer paid for steel sold by Wasatch Steel,
[Findings of Fact 1132, 33, 34, 35, 36; R344-48.]

It is true

that the trial court did not in its Findings state that either
Heaton or Williams was "in the business of selection, appraisal,
or criticism of goods."

Section 76-10-1602(4).

The court did

find, however, that both Heaton and Williams "participated in the
ordering and purchasing by Steelco of certain steel products" and
"were in a position at Steelco to influence the prices that
Steelco paid for certain steel that Steelco purchased from
others, including Wasatch Steel Inc."
R344.]

[Findings of Fact 131;

Whether that finding renders Williams and Heaton a

"person in the business of selection, appraisal, or criticism of
goods" is a question of law for this Court's decision.

If Heaton

and Williams were such persons, all of the elements of bribery
have been established.
Aiding, Soliciting, and Conspiring.

Defendants casually

dismiss conspiracy as a predicate offense by stating that conspiracy, by itself, cannot constitute a predicate offense.
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[Defendants' Brief, p.46 n.10.]

However, the Act provides that a

predicate offense is committed not only if one actually commits
an enumerated offense himself or herself, but also if one solicits, requests, commands, encourages, intentionally aids or
conspires to engage in any specifically enumerated predicate
offense.
language.

Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1602(4).

Defendants ignore this

As noted above, the court found that Volma Heaton

committed multiple thefts and that all elements of the crime of
bribery had been shown with respect to Williams and Heaton
(provided that Williams and Heaton were in the business of
selecting goods).

The court specifically found that Hurst and

Wasatch Steel assisted, aided, requested, and conspired with
Williams and Heaton with respect to these thefts and bribes.
[Findings of Fact 1114, 15, 32, 33, 34, 42, 43, 44; R339, et
seq.]

Thus, by assisting and conspiring with Williams and Heaton

in their independent crimes of theft and bribery, Hurst and
Wasatch Steel themselves committed predicate offenses under
Section 76-10-1602(4).
Only one predicate offense is required, but Steelco proved
three or four.

Defendants1 remaining two arguments cannot

properly be considered on appeal, since neither of them was
properly raised below.

E.g., Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis

Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1980).

Defendants'

written final argument is found at R387, et se%.

The only basis
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advanced there for rejecting Steelcofs racketeering claim is the
failure to show a predicate offense.

[R401-05.]

After the trial

court decided the case, defendants did not suggest or request any
findings or conclusions on the two new theories, which are
presented for the first time in defendants1 Reply Brief.

[R283.]

Defendants1 arguments, addressed immediately below, that Steelco
failed to show a "pattern of unlawful activity11 or an "enterprise" cannot properly be considered by this Court.
C.

Steelco Showed a "Pattern of Unlawful Activity".

This

is another basis advanced by defendants which was never mentioned
by the trial court.

The parties agree upon the governing stat-

utory definition of a pattern:
(2) "Pattern of unlawful activity"
means engaging in conduct which constitutes
the commission of at least three episodes of
unlawful activity, which episodes are not
isolated, but have the same or similar
purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the episodes shall
demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and
be related either to each other or to the
enterprise. Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1602(2).
Following is a complete description from defendants1 Brief of the
deficiency they claim exists in Steelco's proof of a pattern in
this case:
At most, plaintiffs1 claims assert
multiple acts to promote the same transaction
or episode. There was only one actual or
potential victim and no evidence of a broader
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set of criminal objectives. In short, there
was no pattern of racketeering activity.
[Defendants' Brief, p.47.]
Both the Utah courts and governing federal authority reject
defendants1 argument.

In State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 816-17

(Utah App. 1988), the Utah Court of Appeals analyzed the analogous federal authorities and rejected defendant's position.

In

Thompson, defendant argued that several bribes could not constitute a pattern because the bribes were "part of only a single
episode of racketeering conduct" [_Id. at 816] and ftwere in
furtherance of a single criminal objective11 [JA. at 817.] The
Court rejected that argument holding that separate bribes that
were a part of the same overall scheme constituted a "pattern"
under the Act.
The Act's statutory definition of pattern requires (i) at
least three episodes of unlawful activity, (ii) some relationship
between the activities, and (iii) some showing of continuity of
the unlawful conduct.

Although the definition of pattern in the

federal RICO Act is not so comprehensive, the federal courts have
by interpretation adopted what in Utah is the statutory definition of pattern.

E.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S.

479, 496 n.14, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3285 n.14 (1985); and, more
recently, H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 109 S.Ct.
2893, 2899-2902 (1989).

Those cases firmly embrace the Utah

statutory definition of pattern and amplify on the requirements
of relationship and continuity.
RICOfs legislative history reveals Congress1
intent that to prove a pattern of racketeering activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must
show that the racketeering predicates are
related, and that they amount to or pose a
threat of continued criminal activity.
For analytic purposes these two constituents
of RICOfs pattern requirement must be stated
separately, though in practice their proof
will often overlap. H.J. Inc., 109 S.Ct.,
supra, at 2900.
The H.J. Court went on to state that the relationship requirement
is established "if it embraces criminal acts that have the same
or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods
of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics that are not isolated events.11

Ld. at 2901.

This language is an almost verbatim quotation of the Utah Actfs
requirement of "relationship.11
Here, the "relationship" requirement is fulfilled as prescribed by the statutory language.

The thefts had the same or

similar purposes -- acquiring steel stolen from Steelco at
bargain prices for resale by Wasatch Steel at a profit.

The

result was always the same - - i n the case of the steel thefts,
Steelco lost its steel, and Heaton and Wasatch Steel in substance
divided the value between them -- Heaton was paid a fraction of
its value, and Wasatch Steel resold it at a handsome profit.
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In

the case of the bribes, a similar pattern emerged.

The amount by

which the price paid by Steelco was fraudulently inflated was
split between Hurst/Wasatch Steel, on the one hand, and the
recipient of the bribe, Williams/Heaton, on the other hand.
Again, Steelco lost.

The episodes had the same participants --

Wasatch Steel, Hurst, Heaton, and Williams.
victim -- Steelco.

They had the same

They had the same methods of commission —

each theft and delivery and each bribe transaction were virtually
identical to the others.

Relationship has been established here.

With respect to the "continuity" requirement, there was some
division of authority prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
the H.J, case.

Some courts held that continuity required that a

single fraudulent scheme embracing multiple acts was insufficient
to establish the pattern requirement.

The H.J. Court specifically

rejected that position and stated:
We adopt a less inflexible approach that
seems to us to derive from a common-sense,
everyday understanding of RICO's language and
Congress1 gloss on it. What a plaintiff or
prosecutor must prove is continuity of
racketeering activity, or its threat,
simpliciter. Id. at 2901.
The H.J. Court went on to show examples of various methods by
which continuity may be proved:
A party alleging a RICO violation may demonstrate continuity over a closed period by
proving a series of related predicates
extending over a substantial period of time.
Id. at 2902.
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Here, we have on the order of 100 thefts over a four year period
of time -- clearly satisfying the continuity requirement.

The

Supreme Court also identified other methods by which continuity
can be established:
The continuity requirement is likewise
satisfied where it is shown that the predicates are a regular way of conducting defendant's ongoing legitimate business (in the
sense that it is not a business that exists
for criminal purposes) or of conducting or
participating in an ongoing and legitimate
RICO "enterprise." Id. at 2902.
Again, Wasatch Steel's receipt over four years of 100-odd loads
of stolen steel and its payment of at least eleven bribes, as a
matter of law, establish a regular way of conducting Wasatch
Steel's ongoing business.
The federal district court cases cited in defendants' Brief
were decided prior to the controlling H.J, case, are inconsistent
with it, and do not concern multiple criminal acts such as are
presented here -- 100-odd discrete thefts and eleven or more
discrete bribes.

Rather, defendants' cases address whether a

single fraudulent scheme, loan transaction, or brokerage account
can constitute a "pattern."

Steelco respectfully submits that if

defendants1 knowing receipt of stolen materials on 100-odd
occasions and payment of eleven separate bribes over a four year
period do not constitute a "pattern of unlawful activity," the
requirement cannot ever as a practical matter be fulfilled.
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D.

Steelco has Shown a Racketeering Enterprise. Defen-

dants1 claimed absence of proof of an "enterprise" was also never
argued by them or found by the trial court below.

Section

76-10-1603 generally requires a showing that there existed an
"enterprise" to which any "person" was related through a pattern
of unlawful activity.

The term "enterprise" is defined in

Section 76-10-1602(1):
(1) "Enterprise" means any individual,
sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other
legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a
legal entity, and includes illicit as well as
licit entities.
This Court in State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631 (Utah 1988) adopted
a sweeping definition of that language.

In McGrath, the Court

concluded that an "ongoing association" between defendant and one
Marcus established the existence of the requisite enterprise:
Defendant and Marcus had an ongoing association in fact for the purpose of making money
from the sale of controlled substances.
Defendant regularly "fronted" drugs to
Marcus, who in turn sold them to individual
users. When the two men experienced difficulty keeping track of their accounts, they
agreed to keep written accounts of their
numerous transactions. A ledger book kept by
Marcus showed seventy-four transactions
between him and defendant. This association
was much more than an isolated transaction
between an independent seller and buyer
conducted at arm's length. Defendant often
had others deliver for him and compensated
them for their services. Marcus bought his
supplies from other sources only when defen-
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dant was unavailable. The two men functioned
as a "continuing unit for a common purpose of
engaging in a course of conduct." These
facts show an ongoing enterprise the purpose
of which was to traffic in controlled substances .
Id. at 637.

Here, there was a very similar relationship between

Heaton and Hurst/Wasatch Steel which established such an "enterprise.11

Through an ongoing conspiracy, as the trial court found,

Heaton systematically stole product from his employer, Steelco,
and delivered the stolen goods to Wasatch Steel for resale.
Heaton was paid a fraction of the value of the steel with Wasatch
Steel receiving the balance in profits.

Similarly, in the case

of the kickbacks, Hurst/Wasatch Steel, on the one hand, and
Heaton and Williams, on the other hand, had an agreement under
which Heaton and Williams would cause their employer, Steelco, to
pay an inflated price for steel sold by Wasatch Steel, with the
price bump being split between Wasatch Steel and/or Hurst, on the
one hand, and Williams and Hurst, on the other hand.

Since the

trial court expressly found that Hurst and Wasatch Steel conspired with Heaton and Williams as just indicated, the trial
court made all necessary findings to determine the existence of
several "enterprises," both with respect to the steel thefts and
the kickbacks -- one between Wasatch Steel/Hurst and Heaton as to
thefts, one between Wasatch Steel/Hurst and Heaton as to bribes,
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one between Wasatch Steel/Hurst and Williams as to bribes, and
one between Hurst and Wasatch Steel as to both bribes and thefts.
Finally, defendants argue that the "enterprise" must be
distinct from the "persons" who are defendants in the action.
First, as has been demonstrated above, Steelco proved several
"enterprises," each of which is distinct from the persons who are
defendants in this action.

As this Court found in McGrath, an

association between a named defendant and another constitutes
such an enterprise, which is exactly the situation here.

Second,

any distinctness requirement applies only to Subsection (3) of
Section 76-10-1603.

Defendants have cited two cases (Grant v.

Union Bank, 629 F.Supp. 570 (D.Utah 1986) and Bennett v. United
States Trust Co. of New York, 770 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1985), cert,
denied, 106 S.Ct. 800 (1986)) that hold that the "enterprise"
must be distinct from the "persons" who are defendants in the
action under 18 U.S.C. §1962(c).

The courts have applied a

different rule with respect to 18 U.S.C. §1962(a) and (b)_, which
are substantially similar to Subsections (1) and (2) of Utah Code
Ann. §76-10-1603.

The courts have held £hat, with respect to

claims under Subsections (a) or (b) of 18 U.S.C. §1962, a named
defendant may be both the responsible "person" and the "enterprise" to establish liability under the Act.

E.g., Petro-Tech,

Inc. v. Western Co. of North America, 824 F.2d 1349, 1361 (3rd
Cir. 1987) ("where a corporation engages in racketeering activ-
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ities and is the direct or indirect beneficiary of the pattern of
racketeering activity, it can be both the [liable] "person" and
the "enterprise" under Section 1962(a)"); to the same effect, see
Masi v, Ford City Bank & Trust Co., 779 F.2d 397, 402 (7th Cir.
1985); Schreiber Distrib. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d
1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that if a corporation is the
direct or indirect beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering
activity, it can be both the "person" and the "enterprise" for
violations under Sections 18 U.S.C. 1962(a) or (b)). Here,
Wasatch Steel engaged in racketeering activities and was the
direct or indirect beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering
activity by (i) purchasing goods known to be stolen at bargain
prices and (ii) selling its own goods to Steelco at fraudulently
inflated prices.

Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1603(1) and (2) are

substantially identical to the corresponding provisions of the
federal act contained in 18 U.S.C. §1962(a) and (b). Subsection
1 provides as follows:
It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived . . . from a
pattern of unlawful activity in which the
person has participated as a principal, to
use or invest, directly or indirectly, any
part of that income, or the proceeds of the
income . . . in the acquisition of any
interest in or the establishment or operation
of, any enterprise.
The trial court specifically found that Wasatch Steel used the
profits received from resales of the stolen steel in the business
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of Wasatch Steel.

[Findings of Fact 114; R339.]

Similarly, the

court expressly found that Wasatch Steel received an inflated
price for the steel that it sold to Steelco with respect to which
kickbacks were paid.

[Findings of Fact 1133-35; R345-47.]

enterprises have been established in this case:

Five

(i) the asso-

ciation of Hurst and Wasatch Steel as to both bribes and thefts,
(ii) the association of Wasatch Steel/Hurst and Williams as to
bribes, (iii) the association of Wasatch Steel/Hurst and Heaton
as to thefts, (iv) the association of Wasatch Steel/Hurst and
Heaton as to bribes, and (v) Wasatch Steel, a corporation,
itself.

Only one is required.

Finally, an enterprise can be

established through the continuing association of Lynn Hurst and
Wasatch Steel Inc. to defraud Steelco.

That is, Hurst, as an

employee of Wasatch Steel, and Wasatch Steel, as a distinct
entity, joined together in an association, which is not named as
a defendant in this case, to defraud Steelco through the stolen
steel and kickback transactions.
II. STEELCO IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER
UNDER THE RECEIVING- STOLEN PROPfiRTTTSTSTUTE
Defendants advance two arguments why Steelco should not
recover under the receiving stolen property statute:

First,

defendants claim that they are not included in the class of
persons mentioned in Section 76-6-408(2)(d).
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Second, defendants

claim that there was an inadequate showing that defendants knew
the goods were stolen.

Each will be addressed in turn.

Section 76-6-412(2) only renders liable "any person mentioned in Subsection 76-6-408(2)(d).ff

That subsection in turn

defines that class of persons as M a pawnbroker or person who has
or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property."

Defendants concede, as

they must, and the court correctly found that Wasatch Steel is in
the business of purchasing and selling used steel.
Fact 13; R335.]

[Findings of

Instead, defendants argue with neither authority

nor logic that the statute describes and applies only to pawnbrokers.

If the legislature had intended the statute to describe

and apply only to pawnbrokers, why on earth did the legislature
provide that the class of potentially liable defendants includes
f,

a pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in

or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property. . . ." Defendants1 argument entirely reads out of the
statute the underscored language.

This Court has uniformly held

that, in interpreting a statute, effect should be given to "every
word of the statute." Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 n.ll
(Utah 1988).

Further, the words of a statute should be given

their "commonly accepted meanings." Hector, Inc. v. United
Savings & Loan Ass'n, 741 P.2d 542, 546 (Utah 1987).

Wasatch

Steel and Hurst are, according to the trial court's Findings,
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parties who have or operate a business "dealing in
used . . . personal property11 within the commonly accepted
meaning of those terms.
Defendants next argue that an inadequate showing has been
made that defendants knew the goods were stolen.
court expressly so found.

First, the

[Findings of Fact 113; R338.]

As was

demonstrated in Steelcofs opening Brief, that finding is amply
supported by the record.

In addition, Steelco proved and the

trial court found the facts that give rise to a statutory presumption of that requisite knowledge-under Section
76-6-408(2)(d)(2).

Those four bases for the statutory pre-

sumption are identified at pages 87-89 of Steelcofs opening
Brief.

Defendants1 only response is that the findings cited

therein are clearly erroneous and were not made in sufficient
detail.

[Defendants1 Reply Brief at pp. 49-50.]

No effort was

made to establish that the findings were clearly erroneous.

In

most cases, the findings are of objective facts and are stated in
graphic detail.

The four bases for the statutory presumption of

knowledge are, in the main, uncontested:

(a) Defendants were in

possession of property stolen on a separate occasion [Findings of
Fact 110]; (b) Defendants received stolen property within the
year preceding the transaction in question [Findings of Fact
110]; (c) Defendants acquired the material for consideration
known to be far below its value [Findings of Fact 114]; and (d)
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Defendants received property without requiring that the seller
certify in writing as to his ownership of the property, as Lynn
Hurst himself testified was the fact [R450 at 68]. Under Section
76-6-408(2), any of the four foregoing items suffice to give rise
to a presumption that defendants knew or believed that the
subject property was stolen or probably stolen.
CONCLUSION
The trial court found each element to defendants1 liability
under both the Racketeering Enterprises Act and Utah's receiving
stolen property statute.

The lower court rejected defendants1

liability under these statutes based upon an erroneous legal
interpretation of both statutes. Defendants1 arguments are based
upon matters generally not argued to the trial court, not found
by the trial court, and not supported by the evidence.
Steelco respectfully requests that this Court grant the
relief requested in the Conclusion of its opening Brief.
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